The Signal messenger has been considered the most secure messenger in the world for several years. It has been recommended by cybersecurity experts. Signal is associated with a high level of data protection and a policy aimed at maximizing user privacy. But even such a secure tool was threatened — in 2020, the company Cellebrite announced its hacking.
Hidden monitoringSignal cannot be hacked
Signal is the messenger that seems made for those who want to stay in the shadows. It seems that its developers were not just inspired by security principles, but literally spent nights in the code, encrypting everything that could be. Signal Protocol — a powerful system that encrypts text messages, calls, and even attachments as if they were the secrets of spies from spy novels.
And now, imagine that according to Signal's privacy policy, this messenger collects almost nothing about you: phone number, registration date, and last login.
All.
No additional information.
Unlike WhatsApp and Telegram, which like to slightly spy on their users, Signal does not store chat history on servers. This approach makes it a real find for those looking for an alternative to popular messengers and care about privacy.
But even the strongest armor sometimes cracks.
Israeli company Cellebrite proved this by managing to hack Signal with their tool Physical Analyzer.
They found the key in the Android Keystore, dissected the messenger's database, and proudly announced that they managed to decrypt chats. This was the first case where the behavior of the user was not questioned, but the very thesis of Signal's invulnerability as a system was put into doubt. It's strange to imagine: a messenger that Edward Snowden himself trusted turned out to be so vulnerable.
It is important to understand why this hack caused such a resonance. It was not about hacking third-party applications or the mistakes of the users themselves. For the first time, the messenger itself was under attack — its internal protection architecture. This incident was not widespread, but it became symbolic: in 2020, it became clear that absolute security does not exist even where it is embedded in the very architecture of the product.
However, Signal did not sit idly by.
The development team immediately began patching the holes. They always release updates promptly so that users can feel more secure. But the story with Cellebrite showed that absolute security does not exist. Even the most secure messenger can become prey to experienced hackers or intelligence agencies.
Latest news about Signal
The years 2024–2025 became a time of strengthening and development for Signal. Developers continued to improve the messenger, not limiting themselves to the status of 'the most secure' — they systematically enhanced protection and encryption, closing gaps and adapting to new threats. Security algorithms have been updated, which increased resistance to modern compromise methods, and the application's architecture became even more resilient to device-level attacks and encryption key threats.
In addition to improvements in protection, developers also implemented more practical updates to the interface and functionality. The application has become more convenient: the interface has become more intuitive, media and attachment handling is faster, and navigation is easier. Signal has managed to balance security and convenience without sacrificing one for the other.
Significant drawbacks of Signal
Signal is often presented as a messenger that cannot be hacked in principle. However, there has long been a whole market of tools and services claiming the possibility of remote access to accounts — without installing the application, without user involvement, and without visible traces. The very fact of the emergence and active promotion of such software already speaks to an important point: Signal is viewed as a target, not as an unattainable standard..
It is important to clarify: such solutions do not break encryption 'head-on' and do not read messages directly from servers — Signal indeed does not store conversations in the cloud. Their logic is built differently: exploitation of weak points in authorization, interception of confirmation codes, working with sessions, devices, and metadata, as well as attacks on the 'messenger — operating system — network' bundle.. This is where those loopholes appear that are rarely mentioned in official security descriptions.
This is why the myth of Signal's complete invulnerability seems increasingly unconvincing. When security is built around local data storage, any successful compromise of a device, session, or authentication process automatically translates into access to the messenger. In such scenarios, it is not about the user's fault or third-party clients, but about the boundaries of the protection model itself..
It is also indicative what capabilities such tools offer: remote access, activity monitoring, operation without installation and notifications..
A program that anonymously
penetrates and monitors an account in Signal
As a result, Signal remains one of the most secure messengers on the market. But 'the most secure' does not mean 'invulnerable'. The history of 2020, as well as the emergence of specialized tools to bypass protection, clearly shows: with sufficient resources and knowledge of the architecture, hacking is possible. And this is perhaps the most important conclusion for those who are used to perceiving Signal as an absolute shield.
Hack someone else's Signal account is possible. And it no longer sounds like a hypothesis or a scary story from forums. Yes, the messenger is still considered one of the most secure, but its reputation as an 'absolutely impregnable fortress' has long been cracked. Today, Signal is not a mythical safe, but a complex system that, as practice has shown, has entry points.
The most alarming thing is that accessing someone else's correspondence no longer always requires a user error, a phishing link, or an installed spyware application. Tools and methods have emerged that work differently — quietly, remotely, and without obvious traces. That is why the question of Signal's security is increasingly shifting from the realm of 'is it possible' to the realm of 'under what conditions'.
Signal is still perfect for those for whom privacy is a matter of profession and safety: journalists, activists, lawyers, people working with sensitive information. This is an audience willing to put up with inconveniences, the lack of cloud backups, and a minimalist interface for the sake of feeling secure.
But for ordinary users, the cult of security around Signal can play a cruel joke. The illusion of complete protection relaxes — it creates a sense that the correspondence is virtually unreachable. The reality is that if there is a need to peek into someone else's Signal chats, there are already specialized solutions for that today. And it is this fact that destroys the main myth surrounding the messenger.
Signal remains a strong player in the world of privacy. But it is no longer the last bastion. And perhaps the most dangerous thing is not the vulnerabilities themselves, but the belief that they are impossible.